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ABSTRACT 
Construction industry observers tout the use of financial incentives as promoters of 
motivation and commitment on projects.  Yet, little empirical evidence exists concerning 
their effectiveness. What are the drivers of motivation on construction projects?  The reasons 
that construction project participants are motivated to pursue voluntary incentive goals are 
examined through four Australian case studies. The results demonstrate the critical role 
played by project relationships and equitable contract conditions in promoting the 
effectiveness of financial incentives.  In the context of a construction project, this study finds 
financial incentives to be less important to motivation and performance than relationship 
enhancement initiatives. This finding is unexpected and has implications for the design of 
project procurement strategies. These results suggest if project clients ignore the importance 
of relationship quality between participants, the impact of any financial incentive will be 
compromised.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Construction projects shape the built environment in which people live and work. The 
built environment is typically a country’s most important asset, both economically and 
socially. For advanced countries around 95% of people work in the built environment, where 
they generate around 80% of GDP (Newton, Hampson, and Drogemuller, 2009). The 
performance of construction projects and the whole-of life management of constructed assets 
influences a country’s productivity, competitiveness, living quality and ecological 
sustainability (Newton et al., 2009). Yet many countries face significant challenges with the 
performance of construction projects and constructed assets (Manseau and Seaden, 2001).  
The use of financial incentives in construction projects is seen as a key means of 
improving built environment outcomes. Financial incentives are typically used on 
construction projects to invigorate motivation towards above business-as-usual (BAU) goals 
and provide the contractor with the opportunity for higher profit margins if exceptional 
performance is achieved. BAU includes the mandatory minimum requirements that are to be 
delivered under the construction contract. Voluntary goals are higher-order goals set by the 
client above minimum BAU requirements. Financial incentives aim to increase the efficiency 
and effectiveness of projects by stimulating the motivation to work harder and smarter in 
pursuit of such goals (Sliwka, 2003). There are three main types of financial incentives used 
on construction contracts (Bower, Ashby, and Smyk, 2002):  
1. Share of savings incentives, where cost savings are shared between the client and the 
contractor based on an agreed formula; 
2. Schedule incentives, where a premium is offered to the contractor for the early 
completion of the project; and 
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3. Technical performance bonuses for meeting performance targets, other than cost and 
schedule. A performance bonus arrangement can be applied to a wide range of 
performance areas such as quality and functionality.   
 The complexity of the construction product supply chain is one of the major challenges 
in applying financial incentives to motivate project teams. Construction projects emerge in 
fragments (Mitropoulos and Tatum, 2000). Disjointed relationships between contracting 
parties, misalignment of objectives, and risk-averse behaviors characterize construction 
projects (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004). Similarly, adversarial business environments in 
the construction industry are a major barrier to continued growth and the diffusion of new 
innovation (Andersen, Cook, and Marceau, 2004). Thus, not only are financial incentives 
necessary to enhance motivation at personal and organizational levels, but also to promote 
unified motivation across highly interdependent and contractually fragmented project teams. 
The teams comprise diverse actors such as contractors, designers and suppliers brought 
together on a one-off basis, with little scope to build cohesive team relationships over time. 
The difficulty in assessing performance in highly interdependent teams compounds the 
challenge as individual output may be almost indistinguishable from group output (Howard, 
Turban, and Hurley, 2002). Thus, team-based financial incentives suit construction projects 
with high levels of sequential and mutual task interdependence. The unique multi-firm 
production model that construction projects use shapes this interdependence.  
The research proposition is that the above factors create a unique environment for the 
application of financial incentives. The construction project environment varies to that dealt 
with by the extensive literature on financial incentives in the context of individual 
psychological processes (e.g., Adams, 1963; Bandura, 1986; Deci, 1971) or the work 
motivation of employees at organization level (e.g., Hackman and Oldham, 1980; Katzell and 
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Thompson, 1990; Locke and Latham, 2004). The research described here adds an important 
new dimension to such literature.  
Both academics and business commentators consistently argue that performance 
incentives can improve project outcomes for the principal (client) and their agents 
(contractors and consultants) (Bower et al., 2002; Howard, Bell, and McCormick, 1997). For 
example, Australian construction industry reports claim procurement approaches containing 
equitable incentive mechanisms applied across the entire project team can improve both 
project and industry performance (Kenley, London and Watson, 2000; AEGIS, 1998; APCC, 
1997). A more recent study indicates that Australian construction clients have the necessary 
competence to develop such strategies (Manley, 2006), if they have appropriate information.  
Despite the heralded benefits of financial incentives, until now little construction-
specific information has been available to project managers on how to effectively implement 
them. Although previous work indicates the importance of client competence and team-based 
incentives, no detailed investigation has been conducted on how such changes might be 
implemented to yield maximum advantage. Industry clients across Australia remain skeptical 
about the usefulness of financial incentives and lack understanding of what determines their 
effectiveness (Rose, 2008).  Indeed, little empirical research has investigated the impact of 
incentives on motivation and performance in the context of construction projects; Bresnen 
and Marshall (2000) being a key exception. Bresnen and Marshall note that the connection 
between incentive systems and performance is often portrayed too simplistically in the 
literature. They suggest the need for further investigation into the organizational and inter-
organization dynamics around incentives in the construction context.  
This paper responds to that call and examines the factors that drive motivation to 
achieve voluntary incentive goals on construction projects, hereafter referred to as motivation 
drivers, based on four large-scale Australian construction projects that include financial 
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incentives in their contractual arrangements. The results suggest that without a detailed 
understanding of the context in which financial incentives are applied, they can have a 
detrimental effect on motivation towards voluntary project goals. In particular, the results 
indicate that if construction clients focus on building effective project team relationships, 
then financial incentives will have a more positive impact on motivation. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Review of construction and general management contributions (Rose 2008) suggests that to 
assess the impact of financial incentive on motivation in a project environment, consideration 
must be given to both potential extrinsic (external) and intrinsic (internal) drivers of 
motivation. Therefore, a big picture approach must be taken to identify and explore the 
various drivers within the project that promote or discourage motivation to determine the 
value of financial incentives in driving motivation and thus, performance. The unit of 
analysis is the construction project, which encompasses the project structure, team and 
dynamics. Given the lack of research into the impact of incentives on motivation and 
performance in construction (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000), the present article develops a 
conceptual framework, based on theoretical evidence, to explore the research question: ‘What 
are the drivers of motivation on construction projects?’  
 
Figure 1 here. 
 
Figure 1 outlines the role of motivation on construction projects and shows that 
motivation is a mediating variable between core project activities and project performance. 
Core project activities give rise to various motivation drivers that influence the motivation of 
project participants. Five core activities are conceptualised and motivation is seen to impact 
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performance through four key indicators. The current paper describes the drivers of this 
motivation, about which little is currently known in the context of a construction project. This 
is the gap in the literature addressed here.      
Mullins (1996) argues that performance is a product of motivation, ability and the 
environment. Similarly, Howard et al. (1997) argues a construction contractor’s (agent’s) 
output (or performance) is a function of factors within their control (ability and motivation) 
and external factors outside their control (environment). Although participant ability and 
factors external to the project (e.g. market prices) influence performance outcomes, these 
factors are beyond the scope of the research and are not shown in Figure 1. 
The framework shown in Figure 1 is based on insights from organizational management 
theory (Van Herpen, Van Praag, and Cools, 2005; Moers, 2000; Gibbons, 1998), 
psychological motivational theory (Locke and Latham, 2002; Colquitt, 2001; Hollenbeck and 
Klein, 1987; Bies and Moag, 1986), and economic agency and reciprocity theory (Fehr & 
Falk, 2002; Howard et al., 1997; Holmstom and Milgrom, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). The framework is based on a set of four motivation indicators distilled 
from these theoretical sources, and interpreted in a project-based context. The four indicators 
represent distinct categories that cover key contributions in the literature. The motivation 
indicators developed from the combined theories are: 1. Goal Commitment, 2. Distributive 
Justice, 3. Procedural Justice and, 4. Interactional Justice. This is the first time that such a 
broad range of indicators has been conceptualized for application to a construction project 
environment. The indicators are used in this study to assess the relative impact of financial 
incentives and other project-based motivation drivers. The indicators are briefly defined 
below: 
  
Goal Commitment   
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According to goal-setting theory (Locke and Latham, 1984), individuals or groups make 
calculated decisions about their desired goals, and once the desired goals are identified, the 
goals themselves can act as a motivator. As an extension to goal-setting, goal commitment 
(Hollenbeck & Klein, 1987) refers to the sustained determination and motivation to try for a 
goal; in the case of this research, the performance goal associated with the incentive. Key 
antecedents of goal commitment are those that impact on the attractiveness of goal 
attainment and those that impact on the expectancy of goal attainment (Hollenbeck and 
Klein, 1987). The theory suggests that the way the goals of a financial incentive are managed 
over time will impact motivation and commitment.  
 
Distributive Justice 
Distributive justice theory suggests that the financial reward amount offered will be judged 
by its fairness relative to the effort required achieve the reward. A higher reward ‘intensity’ 
(strength of reward) increases a contact agent’s margin in response to their increased effort 
(Zenger, 2000). In the case of construction projects, distributive justice and its ensuing 
motivation, is assessed in comparison to the risk carried by the contractor and the equity of 
the reward in comparison to other reward recipients in the project team.  
 
Procedural Justice 
Procedural justice suggests that the fairness and transparency of procedures linked to 
incentive distributive decisions will impact a contract agent’s motivation. Procedural justice 
is delivered by adherence to fair measurement criteria such as consistency, correctability 
(flexibility), representativeness, accuracy, bias suppression and ethicality (Leventhal, 1980). 
As task interdependence is high in teams, compared to an individual’s work, procedural 
justice is a particularly important indicator of motivation in teams (Colquitt, 2004).  
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Interactional Justice  
Interactional justice relates to aspects of the communication process between principals and 
agents, such as honesty and respect. Interactional justice indicates that the propriety of the 
principals’ behavior will influence the motivation of an agent (Bies and Moag, 1986). Thus, 
the quality of the relationship between the principal and agent can impact on the agents’ 
perception of incentive fairness.  Organizational behavior can also be influenced by the 
establishment of trust and trustworthiness in ongoing economic exchanges (Gulati and Sytch, 
2008).  
Where potential exists for opportunistic behavior from contract agents due to asymmetric 
information and incomplete contracts, trust and relational quality can play a major role in 
realizing mutual gains in an economic exchange (Ariño, la Torre, and Ring, 2001). Closely 
aligned with these ideas, economic reciprocity theory (Fehr and Falk, 2002) indicates that 
agents are motivated by mutual trustworthiness and the fairness of the incentive intention. 
This theory predicts an agent will be more likely to cooperate voluntarily with the principal 
and reciprocate positive behavior, if they perceive an incentive’s intention is fair and 
honorable. 
These four motivation indicators where used in fieldwork to identify motivation drivers 
that were conceptualized to arise from a set of five core project activities which emerged 
from a review of construction management literature on determinants of project performance 
(Chan, Scott, and Chan, 2004; Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004; Chua, Kog, and Loh, 
1999). The five core activities are mutually exclusive and represent the known possible 
influences on project motivation. They comprise firstly, the four major stages involved in 
delivering construction projects with incentives – (i) Financial Incentive Design, (ii) 
Contract, (iii) Tender Selection, and (iv) Design and Construction Management. The last core 
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project activity is v) Relationship Management, which runs through the final stage, design 
and construction management.  
These framework constructs, the four motivation indicators and five project activities, 
have been derived for the current research based on content analysis of the relevant 
conceptual contributions, which are listed above. These constructs represent a theoretical 
contribution to the literature on construction management and proved instructive during the 
empirical phase of this project-based research. The authors use the framework to identify 
construction project motivation drivers, to fill an observed gap in the literature. During 
fieldwork, questions were framed around the motivation indicators, linked to project 
activities. Rose (2008) provides further information on the theoretical background to the 
framework. 
  
METHOD 
The research project was undertaken between 2003 and 2007. The research problem 
addressed is that many construction managers, tasked with the development of procurement 
strategies for their projects do not have information available to them on how best to 
incorporate financial incentives into their contractual arrangements, nor do they understand 
the impact of financial incentives on project motivation (Rose 2008). Four large scale 
construction project case studies (referred to as case projects) were undertaken to identify the 
key motivation drivers in each project. The study population is large non-residential building 
projects, procured by government clients, under managing contractor arrangements, and 
completed between 2001 and 2006. The research employs a qualitative multiple case study 
methodology, including semi-structured face-to-face interviews, consultation of project and 
contractual documentation (including project briefs and minutes from meetings), review of 
industry publications, and participation in site visits. For each of the case projects, the 
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collection of extensive preliminary data regarding project and participant characteristics, 
helped shape the interviews. The four project sites were also visited before the interviews to 
observe the end results of the projects.  
An inductive case study approach is adopted given the complexity of project 
environments, and the need for in-depth understanding of the dynamics surrounding project-
based motivation in order to effectively scope and identify drivers. This case study method 
results in more valid and reliable findings than a broader quantitative approach. Although Yin 
(2003) acknowledges shortcomings with case studies in terms of external validity due to the 
small and selective samples, the aim of the current research is to derive analytical 
generalizations rather than statistical generalizations, avoiding this problem.  
 Four case projects were sufficient to derive cross-case conclusions in this study. This 
number falls within the optimal range that Eisenhardt (1989b) recommends of between four 
and ten cases to draw robust cross-case conclusions. The sample of four case projects was 
selected in a purposive manner so that they would represent major differences in incentive 
design and project context, whilst holding industry sector, client type, procurement approach, 
project size and time-line constant.  
Within each case study, interviewees comprised four key stakeholder types (client, head 
contractor, consultants and subcontractors) involved in the procurement and delivery of the 
case projects. Two people from each of the four types of stakeholders were interviewed on 
each project, so that overall 32 (2x4x4) face-to-face interviews were conducted, ranging from 
60 to 90 minutes duration and based on semi-structured questioning. Interview questions 
were based on the four motivation indicators. Questions were framed to address the research 
question ‘What are the drivers of motivation on construction projects?’. The questions were 
based on the respondent’s perceptions regarding the specific case project. Respondents were 
asked to describe the structural features of the project, followed by questions about their 
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commitment to the incentive goals, the fairness of the incentive amount in relation to risk, the 
fairness of the incentive measurement process, and their relationship with the client. 
Interview data was captured by digital recording, transcribed verbatim to develop a 
comprehensive database. The primary data amounted to approximately 32,000 words 
contained in interview transcripts across all case projects.  
Informal field notes included observations during the interviews, summaries of 
secondary data and hunches about relationships arising from the interview responses. Such 
field notes help neutralize post-hoc justifications and provide the researcher with background 
to the data analysis, by acknowledging themes that emerge during data collection (Eisenhardt, 
1989b).  
 Case study data was examined using content analysis, which involves categorizing the 
data from the semi-structured interviews and the secondary data to identify the key 
motivation drivers. Each case project is an independent study subjected to cross-case 
analysis.  
Identification and refinement of driver categories was achieved by inductive coding. 
The coding process involved interpretation of each interviewee’s transcript, structured around 
the four motivation indicators. Such data was analyzed through the lens of the five project 
activities. These activities contain the antecedents for motivation drivers and thus guided the 
manual sorting of research data. Key themes were initially allocated to one of the five core 
activities. Multiple themes were allocated per core project activity. A theme was only 
allocated to one activity, as the activities are mutually exclusive. Once all project data had 
been allocated in this way, each project activity was revisited and patterns of dynamism 
where identified. Distinct patterns were separated into coding categories and allocated 
motivation driver labels.  
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.  Each of these label categories were revised and refined until clear lines could be drawn 
between each of the motivation drivers and their association with the motivation indicators 
and project activities. The goal was to define coding categories that captured the breadth of 
interview experience, whilst limiting the categories to key concerns. Care was taken to 
identify categories that cover all instances, are limited in number and are mutually exclusive. 
The coding categories resulting from the processes described above are: (1) Risk Allocation, 
(2) Design Involvement, (3) Value-driven Selection, (4) Future Work, (5) Relationship 
Workshops, (6) Incentive Flexibility, (7) Incentive Goal Opportunities, and (8) Reward 
Distribution. These are the categories that were developed to denote the key motivation 
drivers which emerged from the data. 
 Due to the subjective nature of content analysis, an expert panel of judges was formed 
to test content analysis accuracy and ensure inadvertent bias was minimized. Testing 
provided evidence of reliable coding, with 92% accuracy in matched coding across the three 
expert panel judges.  
 Following the individual case analyses, cross-case triangulation was undertaken to 
identify the key motivation drivers. A simple quantitative analysis was undertaken to assess 
the relative impact of the identified drivers. This involved a weighted count of the number of 
times a driver was mentioned by interviewees. The use of this weighted frequency data to 
derive driver rankings was devised after data collection to assist in prioritizing client action 
arising from the research. Weightings were assigned to the results based on two classes of 
project participants – those eligible for a financial incentive reward, and those who were not 
eligible but contributed to achievement of voluntary goals. Drivers mentioned by reward 
participants received double the weight of those mentioned by non-reward participants. In the 
absence of justification in the literature for a different decision rule, this convention of 
doubling was adopted to reflect the assumption that the views of potential reward recipients 
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carried more weight than the views of non-reward participants on a project. The sensitivity of 
results to this approach was tested by recalibrating findings assuming no difference in the 
value of perceptions held by potential recipients and non-participants. The final ranking of 
drivers remained unchanged. 
 Case study research methods encompass risks associated with researcher subjectivity 
which may negatively impact replication. These risks can be minimized with a strong case 
study protocol (Yin, 2003). For the current study, the protocol comprises a conceptual 
framework (see Figure 1), case study field notes, and triangulation across cases, stakeholder 
types and data types. Case projects were completed no more than five years prior to data 
collection to maximize interviewee recollection and limit the population to a specific period 
to provide some stability in external environmental factors, such as economic cycles. 
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
All of the case projects are from the Australian non-residential building sector and are 
large in scale - ranging from AUS$91.2 million to AUS$135.5 million and are all classified 
as complex and significant projects. The case projects were commissioned by Australian 
government client agencies, and procured under a relationship-based managing contractor 
contract with financial incentives.  The case projects cover key financial incentive design 
types, comprising (1) share of savings, (2) schedule incentives and (3) performance bonuses, 
together with mixes of these. Relationship management arrangements include the selection of 
team members based on their capabilities to commit to the project relationship. The case 
projects also include initial and ongoing relationship workshops, used in various ways. 
Relationship workshops intend to improve the quality of relationships between team 
members by undertaking a series of orchestrated exercises, including problem solving 
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sessions, directed by a facilitator. The aim is to enhance the effectiveness of teamwork by 
encouraging participants to work together as a unit pursuing joint objectives. 
The case projects also vary by the performance measurement systems used, which 
include self-reporting performance benchmarks, exponential measurement based on extra 
scope completed and percentage of cost savings below a target construction sum (TCS).  
Project outcomes differed substantially between case projects. Project participants in 
three of the four case projects achieved the majority of voluntary goals, while in one project 
they failed to achieve any goal and thus the financial incentive reward was not distributed. 
Table 1 summarizes key case project characteristics.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
This section examines the key motivation drivers that impact motivation, effort and 
performance across the four case projects. The behavior of the key project participants is 
investigated in the context of the project environments and the common characteristics across 
the four cases are identified. Table 2 shows the eight key motivation drivers to emerge from 
content analysis of the fieldwork data, guided by the conceptual framework; see Figure 1 for 
the conceptual framework. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Each of the key motivation drivers is ranked by impact in Table 2 (see methods) and 
discussed below under the five core project activities: (i) Financial Incentive Design, (ii) 
Contract, (iii) Tender Selection, (iv) Design and Construction Management and v) 
Relationship Management.  
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Financial Incentive Design 
The offer of a financial incentive directly motivates the majority of reward participants 
even though the rewards varied across the four case projects in terms of financial strength, 
goals, distribution and measurement processes. Several components of the incentive design 
were seen to promote/discourage motivation across all four projects. These components relate 
to: (1) the flexibility of the incentive mechanism to meet changing project priorities – 
incentive flexibility – ranked as the sixth most important motivation driver uncovered in the 
fieldwork, (2) the goal opportunities to achieve the incentive reward – goal opportunities – 
ranked seventh, and (3) the fairness of the incentive reward and its distribution design across 
the project participants – reward distribution – ranked eighth.  
Motivation Driver 6: Incentive Flexibility. The impact of a financial incentive is 
influenced by whether the incentive mechanism can be adjusted to suit changing project 
conditions, to maintain the relevance of the incentive goals and/or measurement processes.  
In project C, the flexibility of the incentive mechanism was displayed through agreement 
with the client to introduce an acceleration incentive (an additional incentive pool) late in the 
construction stages. This strongly promoted motivation (incentive flexibility was a high 
ranked driver in project C). The agreement was perceived to ‘bring reality back to the 
incentive measurement process’ and improved the participants’ expectations that they were 
still able to achieve the goals, despite the presence of unforeseen and uncontrollable project 
factors such as early inaccuracies in the client budget. 
In projects A and B, a lack of flexibility in the incentive goal and measurement process 
impacted negatively on the project participants’ trust in the fairness and measurement 
accuracy. The incentive benchmarks set by the participants early in the project were 
overtaken by changing project circumstances and could not be renegotiated, making 
  
17 
benchmarks more difficult to achieve than expected. This resulted in an unwillingness to 
strive for the voluntary goals.  
Motivation Driver 7: Incentive Goal Opportunities. In project A, aligning multiple 
performance goals with project priorities gave the project participants considerable control 
over their performance, as a wide range of opportunities existed to secure the financial 
incentive, resulting in improved levels of goal motivation.  The multiple goal system in 
project A allowed the participants to focus their efforts on the goals relevant to current 
project priorities, without surrendering opportunities to secure the financial incentive. Project 
participants’ involvement in setting the financial incentive goals through incentive 
development workshops ensured that the goals, measurement procedures and reward 
outcomes were aligned with the project objectives.  
In project B and D, however, the project participants felt that the single incentive goal 
was too restricted, and did not take account of their performance in all key project priority 
areas. The perceived injustice in the development of the goals negatively impacted on 
motivation and goal commitment. This reflected the team’s perception of unfairness over the 
client’s failure to offer an incentive reward for voluntary goals in areas outside the scope of 
the original financial incentive mechanism.   
Motivation Driver 8: Reward Distribution. On projects B and C, the distribution of 
the financial incentive reward impacted on motivation. In project B the project participants 
valued and were motivated by the client’s decision to allow them to decide how the reward 
would be distributed across the team. Allowing the project participants to self-assess their 
contribution as a team and determine how the incentive would be distributed improved 
distributive justice perceptions. In project C, the exclusion of key project participants from 
the incentive distribution reduced their motivation to achieve project goals, but this effect was 
offset by the strength of project relationships. Despite their disgruntlement with incentive 
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design, the excluded participants still assisted the head contractor in identifying value-adding 
innovations due to strong project relationships. Strong project relationships and mutual trust 
within the project team can minimize the motivation deficits caused by financial incentive 
distribution inequity. 
 
Contract  
“Risk allocation” is the only motivation driver emerging from the type of contract in use 
on all four case projects. Risk allocation is the most important motivation driver across all 
five project activities. Risk allocation is ranked 1st by its impact on stakeholder motivation 
on case projects. Perceived equity of risk allocation between the project parties influences 
motivation particularly between the client and the head contractor. This risk allocation 
primarily relates to the risks associated with cost. Despite differences in the contract structure 
across the case projects, the process of managing cost risk strongly impacts voluntary goal 
motivation.  
Motivation Driver 1: Risk Allocation. Each of the projects had their own specific 
contractual arrangements. Under their contracts, the head contractors in projects B and D 
took on a greater share of construction cost risk, than in projects A and C. As the clients took 
on a majority of construction cost risks in projects A and C, this was seen to improve the 
managing contractors’ ability to achieve project goals, as the contractors were less likely to 
be focused on their own financial liabilities, and more likely to perceive the client behavior as 
fair. The contractors’ trust in their client was greater on Projects A and C, so they were less 
likely to try to transfer risk and they appreciated the greater role played by their clients in the 
project team’s decisions to manage design and construction risks.  
Despite this strong motivation in projects A and C, the findings also suggest that a 
perception of equitable risk can be achieved in projects under a cost limited contract, 
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whereby the head contractor must not exceed a nominated guaranteed construction sum 
(GCS), as in projects B and D. Under a GCS clause, the head contractor has a contractual 
obligation to ensure that actual construction costs do not exceed a target cost. If actual costs 
exceed the target cost, then the managing contractor absorbs these cost overruns. The 
distinguishing factor between the allocations of risk in projects B and D is that in project B, a 
limited amount of negotiation occurred between the client and head contractor from when the 
GCS was nominated, until it was agreed, while in project D, an extensive GCS negotiation 
process occurred prior to the settlement of the agreement.  
In project B, the construction team perceived their cost risks were uncontrollable under 
the project conditions, partly because of inaccuracies in the GCS relating to rising 
subcontractor market prices. The inequity in the cost risk allocation significantly constrained 
the contractor’s trust in the client on Project B and strongly influenced the failure of the 
project participants to achieve the voluntary goals by the conclusion of the project. However, 
in project D the opposite situation occurred, where the extensive GCS negotiation process, 
which culminated at the completion of design development stage, provided the opportunity 
for the head contractor to agree to a fair and reasonable GCS based on a well-developed 
design and their knowledge of labor market conditions.  
Turner (2004) argues that the risk allocation of a standard GCS type contract de-
motivates contractors because the cost overrun risks are heavily weighted in the client’s 
favor. However, the findings here suggest that if a GCS is more fairly negotiated, then 
motivation increases, as the quality of the negotiations offer the managing contractor greater 
ability to predict and manage construction costs.  
 
Tender Selection 
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Value-driven selection emerges as a motivation driver in the tender selection process.  
This driver ranks fifth in its impact on stakeholder motivation on the case projects. 
Motivation Driver 5: Value-driven Selection. On all four projects, the selection of 
project participants was based on their ability to add value to the project (rather than the 
traditional price-focused tender selection). This increased the project participants’ 
expectations that voluntary goals could be achieved, promoting trust, commitment and 
motivation. This finding follows from the belief that fellow project team members would be 
willing to align with the team objectives and meet the client’s expectations.  The key 
elements of the value-driven selection process in the projects comprised contractor and 
consultant selection based on non-price criteria and the matching of project team capabilities 
and experience with the primary project objectives.  
The tender selection process on all four projects emphasized non-price criteria such as 
previous performance, and ability aligned with the project objectives. This instilled an 
inherent desire for project participants (both individually and organizationally) to 
demonstrate to their client that they had been rightly selected based on their capability and 
competency, and to uphold their reputation in the delivery of a significant project. 
 
Design and Construction Management  
Design involvement emerges as a motivation driver within the design and construction 
management stages.  This driver ranks fourth overall. 
Motivation Driver 4: Design Involvement. Involving the managing contractor and key 
subcontractors early in the design development and documentation stages promotes voluntary 
goal motivation. Due to the complexity of the designs in the case study projects, the 
consensus of the head contractor and consultant representatives was that the managing 
contractor should be engaged no later than design development stage and, at best, during 
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schematic design stage, to improve the effectiveness of the design development process and 
to improve the perception that project goals can be attained.  
In project A, the involvement of the managing contractor and key subcontractors in 
design development and documentation stages was seen to improve the design team’s ability 
to fast-track the design and manage the integration of design and construction by providing 
buildability advice. Project A was the only project in this study to comprehensively include 
the key subcontractors in the design stages, which increased the head contractor’s 
effectiveness in identifying value-added design options. Such value adding options include 
innovative trade package designs, such as alternate electrical and data communication layouts 
that cost the client less, but improve overall building functionality and accessibility.  The 
client-driven involvement of subcontractors as the ‘buildability experts’ greatly enhanced the 
integration between conceptual design and construction and avoided the need for design 
rework. This early and positive behavior from the client set the scene for strong project 
performance by indicating to the contractor that the client could be trusted to act competently 
in their oversight of the project. 
Projects B and C experienced documentation issues that were attributed to late 
contractor and subcontractor involvement. According to the project participants, these issues 
related to the requirement for the design team to ‘rework’ and re-document the advanced 
design after the contractor was engaged to improve buildability. Participants on both projects 
felt that if the contractor had been involved earlier, the team would have had the opportunity 
to jointly develop the design, preventing unexpected design changes prior to the 
commencement of construction. This ultimately placed pressure on the contingency budgets 
for projects B and C, as the client was required to pay for the extra design documentation 
work completed.  
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Involving contractors early in design stages can increase the ability of project 
participants to manage their performance.  This suggests that increasing the project 
participants’ control over their performance, by actively incorporating the managing 
contractor and key subcontractors in design development, is likely to improve motivation 
towards voluntary goals, due to higher expectations that the goals are achievable. 
 
Relationship Management 
Across all projects, mutual trust, team relationships and supporting processes played a 
vital role in promoting motivation toward voluntary goals. Two areas within relationship 
management significantly promote motivation. These are future work, ranked second and 
relationship workshops, ranked third. 
Motivation Driver 2: Future Work. The potential for future work with a major client 
is a very strong motivation driver. This driver relates to the desire to uphold and improve 
reputation so as to increase future commercial opportunities. This driver is particularly 
relevant to the research population, as Australian government agencies are key repeat clients. 
The desire to strengthen reputation with repeat clients is likely to be stronger here than with 
clients who are less likely to provide further work opportunities.  
The strength of this driver is particularly evident in the outcomes for project B. 
Although the voluntary goals were not achieved on the project, the team delivered the project 
on time and within budget under ‘crisis’ conditions, in which the head contractor was willing 
to absorb significant financial losses. According to the contractor representatives, this was 
primarily due to their long-term relationship with client and their wish to be favorably looked 
upon for future projects, even at the expense of short-term profits.  Future work is a high-
level motivation driver in all projects. The analysis of this driver suggests that rewarding high 
performance by improving future work opportunities can intensify the willingness of project 
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participants to commit to the project relationship and promotes motivation.  This also allows 
the client to capitalize on the benefits of repeat inter-organizational interactions such as 
continuous improvement and improved relational quality. 
Motivation Driver 3: Relationship Workshops. Each project had varying relationship 
development processes, although all had in common an initial relationship workshop and 
informal relationship monitoring which induced high relational quality. This relational 
quality, in turn, promotes motivation towards the project goals. The importance placed on 
strong relationships as a major determinant of motivation in these projects indicates that 
without strong relational quality, the impact of the financial incentive on motivation may be 
decreased.  
In projects A and C, the delivery approach placed greater emphasis on the development 
of the project relationship, with more intensive relationship workshops than in projects B and 
D. The research suggests that the greater the level of team building and trust developed 
through ongoing relationship workshops, the greater the impact on motivation – as this driver 
was ranked high in projects A and C, and only mid-ranked in projects B and D. 
In summary, the results suggest that an intensive relationship improvement strategy will 
increase personal commitment to the voluntary goals on a project, enhancing the level of 
motivation induced through a financial incentive.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Aligning participants’ effort with project goals is a key objective of an effective 
procurement strategy for construction projects. In the four large projects this research 
explores, varying degrees of alignment occurred between the motivations of participants and 
the clients’ desired outcomes. Although financial incentives enhance project participant 
motivation, to maximize benefits, construction clients need a procurement strategy that 
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instills trust, unity and fairness in project team interactions. This implies the need for 
equitable allocation and management of project risk.  
This study is the first to comprehensively explore the drivers within construction project 
design and delivery that impact on motivation towards voluntary project goals. The research 
results have significant implications for construction managers when designing a project 
procurement approach. A key research finding is that underlying distrust between project 
participants can result in negative perceptions of the incentive intention, limiting its impact 
on motivation. Construction clients need to promote financial incentives as a supporting tool 
in the development of trust, cooperation and motivation and not as a performance control 
mechanism within highly detailed contractual specifications. The use of financial incentives 
in a respectful contractual environment will avoid the perception that the client is untrusting 
and suspicious of the contractor’s behavior, and encourage the idea that the client aims to 
promote respect and recognition through rewarding superior performance.  
In summary, offering a financial incentive does not assure project motivation and 
performance automatically. Such incentives may not be sufficient to establish the robust 
relational quality necessary to efficiently and effectively harness inter-organizational efforts 
towards voluntary project goals. The case projects clearly show a wide range of motivation 
drivers influencing motivation and the simple presence of a financial incentive may not be a 
sufficient condition for performance improvement – nor even a necessary condition. 
However, financial incentives can enhance the positive impact of a range of other 
performance-enhancing initiatives, such as an equitable base contract, future work 
opportunities, relationship workshops, up-front design involvement, and value-driven tender 
selection.  
As such a robust approach may not always be possible, given the limited resources of 
clients, prioritization strategies may be necessary. In such circumstances, the findings suggest 
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that clients should focus on creating an equitable contract risk profile and enhancing 
relationships between project participants. These factors have the greatest impact on 
motivation towards voluntary goals, over and above the drivers related to the financial 
incentive design. 
Figure 2 presents a revised conceptual framework which fills a gap in the literature by 
identifying motivation drivers on construction projects and their relative importance. This 
version of the framework represents theoretical advancement in the field of construction 
management by combining two streams of motivation theory to derive four motivation 
indicators to be applied to five core project activities, giving rise to eight motivation drivers. 
These conceptualizations are unique in the construction management context and represent 
advancement of knowledge in this field. Previously, construction management research has 
assumed that financial incentives automatically translate into motivation with little regard to 
the context in which they are applied (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000). The current research 
shows that this motivational environment is far more complex. The research discussed in this 
paper has enabled identification of the diverse motivation drivers that impact construction 
project performance.  This is the first time a comprehensive attempt has been made to 
understand the relative importance of motivation drivers on construction projects. 
 
Figure 2 here. 
 
The study’s findings are consistent with organizational management research which 
similarly emphasizes the importance of relational quality to business outcomes (e.g., Ariño, la 
Torre, and Ring, 2005). The results are therefore likely to hold for a wider range of business 
project environments than those presented here, including non-construction projects. 
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Nevertheless, the future-work motivation driver will not be applicable to one-off project 
clients.  
This research offers a cross-sectional view of the perceptions of key participants on 
individual projects. Future studies can expand this view by collecting the perceptions of key 
participants over time. This expansion would allow the investigation of performance-reward 
feedback loops, if repeat clients were involved. Such a study could provide important 
information to such clients on how financial incentives may strengthen motivation over time 
and over multiple projects. Figure 2 also provides a sound basis for future quantitative 
research which could improve generalizability and validity. Finally, further research into the 
differential value of opinions held by potential incentive recipients versus non-recipients may 
yield a richer explanation of the relative importance of motivation drivers to these two groups 
than that presented here. 
 
  
27 
REFERENCES 
Adams JS. Toward an understanding of inequity. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 
1963; 67: 422-436. 
AEGIS (Australian Expert Group in Industry Studies). Building for Growth: Procurement & 
project delivery in the building & construction industry. Canberra, ACT: Department 
of Industry, Science & Resources; 1998. 
Andersen, PH, Cook C, Marceau, J. Dynamic innovation strategies and stable networks in the 
construction industry: Implanting solar energy projects in the Sydney Olympic 
Village. Journal of Business Research 2004; 57(4): 351-360. 
APCC (Australian Procurement & Construction Council). Construct Australia: Building a 
better Construction Industry in Australia. Perth, WA: APCC; 1997 
Ariño A, la Torre JD, and Ring PS. Relational quality: Managing trust in corporate alliances. 
California Management Review 2001; 44(1): 109-131. 
Arino A, la Torre JD, Ring PS. Relational quality and inter-personal trust in strategic 
alliances. European Management Review 2005; 2: 15-27. 
Bandura A. Social foundations of thought and action: A social-cognitive theory. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; 1986. 
Bies RJ, Moag JF. Interactional justice: Communication criteria of fairness. In:  Lewicki RJ, 
Sheppard BH, and Bazerman, MH, editors. Research on Negotiations in 
Organizations.  Greenwich, CT: JAI Press; 1986. pp. 43-55. 
Bower D, Ashby G, Gerald K, Smyk W. Incentive mechanisms for project success. Journal of 
Management in Engineering 2002; 18(1): 37-43. 
  
28 
Bresnen M, Marshall N. Motivation, commitment and the use of incentives in partnerships 
and alliances. Construction Management and Economics 2000; 18(5): 587-598. 
Chan APC, Scott D, Chan APL. Factors affecting the success of a construction project. 
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 2004; 130(1): 153-155. 
Chua DKH, Kog YC, Loh PK. Critical success factors for different project objectives. 
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 1999; 125(3): 142-150. 
Colquitt JA. On the dimensionality of organizational justice: A construct validation of a 
measure.  Journal of Applied Psychology 2001; 86(3): 386-400. 
Colquitt JA. Does the justice of the one interact with the justice of the many? Reactions to 
procedural justice in teams. Journal of Applied Psychology 2004; 89(4): 633-646. 
Deci E. Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 1971; 18: 105-115. 
Eisenhardt KM. Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management 
Review 1989a; 14(1): 57-74. 
Eisenhardt KM. Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management 
Review 1989b; 14(4): 532-550. 
Fehr E, Falk A. Psychological foundations of incentives. European Economic Review 2002; 
46: 687-724. 
Gibbons R. Incentives in organizations. The journal of Economic Perspectives 1998; 12(4): 
115-132. 
Gulati R, Sytch M. Does familiarity breed trust? Revisiting the antecedents of trust. 
Managerial and Decision Economics 2008; 29: 165-190. 
Hackman R, Oldham G. Work redesign. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley; 1980. 
  
29 
Hollenbeck JR, Klein HJ. Goal commitment and the goal-setting process: Problems, 
prospects and proposals for future research. Journal of Applied Psychology 1987; 
72(2): 212-220. 
Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Multitask Principal-Agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset 
ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 1991; 7: 24-
52.  
Howard LW, Turban DB, Hurley SK. Cooperating teams and competing rewards strategies: 
Incentives for team performance and firm productivity. Journal of Behavioral and 
Applied Management 2002; 3(3): 248-263. 
Howard WE, Bell LC, McCormick RE. Economic principals of contractor compensation. 
Journal of Management in Engineering 1997; 13(5): 81-89. 
Jensen MC, Meckling WH. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 1976; 3(4): 305--360. 
Katzell R, Thompson D. Work motivation: Theory and practice. American Psychologist 
1990; 45(2): 144-153. 
Kenley R, London K, Watson J. Strategic procurement in the construction industry: 
Mechanisms for public sector clients to encourage improved performance in 
Australia. Journal of Construction Procurement 2000; 6(1): 4-19. 
Leventhal, GS. What should be done with equity theory? New approaches to the study of 
fairness in social relationships. In: Gergen K, Greenberg M, Willis R, editors. Social 
Exchange: Advances in Theory and Research. New York: Plenum; 1980. pp. 27-55. 
Locke EA, Latham GP. Goal setting: A motivational technique that works!. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; 1984. 
  
30 
Locke EA, Latham GP. Building a practically useful theory of goal setting and task 
motivation: A 35-year odyssey. American Psychologist 2002; 57(9): 705-717. 
Locke EA, Latham GP. What should we do about motivation theory? Six recommendations 
for the twenty-first century. Academy of Management Review  2004; 29(3): 388–403. 
Manley K. The innovation competence of repeat public sector clients in the Australian 
construction industry. Construction Management and Economics 2006; 24(12): 1295-
1304. 
Manseau A, Seaden G. Innovation in Construction: An International Review of Public Policy.  
New York, NY: Spon Press; 2001. 
Mitropoulos P, Tatum CB. Management-driven integration. Journal of Management in 
Engineering 2000; 16(1): 48-58. 
Moers F. The role of performance measure characteristics in the design of incentive systems: 
An empirical analysis. Research Memoranda 020. Maastricht:  METEOR, Maastricht 
Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization; 2000. 
Mullins LJ. Management and organizational behavior. London, UK:  Pitman Publishing; 
1996. 
Newton P, Hampson K, Drogemuller R. Transforming the built environment through 
construction innovation. In: Newton P, Hampson K, Drogemuller R, editors. 
Technology, Design and Process Innovation in the Built Environment. Abingdon: 
Taylor and Francis; 2009. pp. 3-28 
Rahman MM, Kumaraswamy MM. Contracting relationship trends and transitions. Journal of 
Management in Engineering 2004; 20(4): 147-161. 
  
31 
Rose TM. The impact of financial incentive mechanisms on motivation in Australian large 
non-residential building projects. Doctoral dissertation. Brisbane: Queensland 
University of Technology; 2008. 
Sliwka D. On the hidden costs of incentive schemes. IZA Discussion Paper No. 844. Bonn: 
Institute for the Study of Labor; 2003. 
Turner JR. Farsighted project contract management: incomplete in its entirety. Construction 
Management and Economics 2004; 22: 75-83. 
Van Herpen M, Van Praag M, Cools K. The effects of performance measurement and 
compensation on motivation: An empirical study. De Economist 2005; 153: 303-329. 
Yin RK. Case study research: Design and methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications; 
2003. 
Zenger TR, Marshall CR. The determinants of incentive intensity in group-based rewards. 
Academy of Management Journal 2000; 43(2): 149-163. 
  
32 
 
FIGURE 1 
Conceptual Framework - Motivation on Construction Projects 
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FIGURE 2 
Revised Conceptual Framework – Motivation on Construction Projects  
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i. Financial Incentive Design 
MD Incentive Flexibility - Flexibility to modify 
goals/ measurement processes  
MD Incentive Goal Opportunities - Multiple-goal 
incentive that increases opportunities to secure 
incentive reward 
MD Reward Distribution - Team performance-
based reward distribution and a valued reward level 
 
ii. Contract  
MD Risk Allocation - Equitable cost risk profile 
between client and managing contractor and fair 
contract price negotiation  
 
iii. Tender Selection 
MD Value-driven tender - Value-driven tender 
selection based on non-price criteria 
 
iv. Design and Construction Management 
MD Design Involvement - Early contractor 
involvement in design stages 
 
v. Relationship Management 
MD Future Work - Possible future work 
opportunities to motivate performance 
MD Relationship Workshops - Formal 
relationship development program including early 
workshops and ongoing reviews 
 
 
 
MD = Motivation Driver 
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TABLE 1  
Case Project Characteristics 
 
 
 
REGIONAL 
HOSPITAL 
REDEVELOPMENT 
NEW 
MAGISTRATE 
COURTS 
COMPLEX 
CONVENTION 
CENTRE 
EXTENSION 
NEW HEALTH 
CAMPUS 
Code Project A Project B Project C Project D 
Incentive 
type 
Combination  Technical 
performance bonus 
Combination Share of savings 
Building 
type 
Hospital 
redevelopment 
Court complex 
(greenfield) 
Convention centre 
redevelopment 
Hospital campus 
(greenfield) 
Contractual 
arrangement 
 
Managing Contractor 
(Construction 
Management) 
Managing Contractor 
(Design and 
Construction 
Management) 
Managing Contractor 
(Construction 
Management) 
Managing 
Contractor (Design 
and Construction 
Management) 
Incentive 
outcome 
Majority of voluntary 
goals achieved 
Failure to achieve 
voluntary goal 
Majority of 
voluntary goals 
achieved 
Voluntary goal 
achieved 
Final cost 
(AUS$) 
91.2 million 135.5 million 92 million 80 million 
Completion 
date 
May 2005 November 2004 September 2001 October 2001 
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TABLE 2 
Key Motivation Drivers and Project Activities 
  
Key Motivation Driver Core Project Activities  Identified on 
Case Projects 
Ranking 
Risk Allocation Contract  A,B,C,D 1 
Future Work Relationship Management A,B,C,D 2 
Relationship  
Workshops 
Relationship Management A,B,C,D 3 
Design Involvement Design and Construction 
Management 
A,B,C,D 4 
Value-driven Selection Tender Selection A,B,C,D 5 
Incentive Flexibility Financial Incentive Design A,B,C 6 
Incentive Goal 
Opportunities 
Financial Incentive Design A,B,D 7 
Reward Distribution Financial Incentive Design A,C 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
